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Unlike the United States, which has placed very few re-
strictions on the ability of domestic residents to invest 
abroad or foreigners to invest domestically, most countries 
have in the past chosen to substantially restrict internation-
al capital flows. Recently, though, there has been move-
ment toward more open financial markets. The interna-
tional component of this recent liberalization of financial 
markets has included reduced restrictions not only on bor-
rowing and lending internationally, but also on the trade 
of more sophisticated assets, such as stocks, and the hold-
ing of deposits denominated in foreign currencies. The ex-
tensive international portfolio diversification which more 
integrated international financial markets would allow has 
not as yet materialized (French and Poterba 1991, Tesar 
and Werner 1992). However, since such a diversification 
would enable countries to mitigate the risk associated with 
fluctuations in domestic output by reducing their impact 
on domestic wealth and thus raise welfare, the degree of 
international diversification is likely to increase in the near 
future as transaction costs decline and information about 
the various opportunities becomes more widespread. (See 
Svensson 1988 for a discussion of the motivations for 
trade in risky assets.) 
As world financial markets become more integrated 
and people more internationally diversified and hence 
more insulated from domestic economic shocks, they are 
at the same time more exposed to foreign shocks. As a re-
sult, the extent to which events in foreign countries, such 
as the recent decline in the Tokyo stock market, affect the 
United States and other economies will probably increase. 
This may substantially alter the response of a country's 
economy to normal business cycle shocks. Economists 
have not as yet developed models which can provide 
much insight as to the potential effects of an increase in 
international diversification on the volatility of key macro-
economic aggregates. This article develops a very simple 
model in which output fluctuations are induced by pro-
ductivity shocks. I use this model to examine the likely 
impact of increased financial integration. 
The article focuses on the impact of the increasing 
trade of sophisticated financial assets. With such assets, 
the payoff on an asset is state-dependent or -contingent; 
hence, these assets can induce large ex post income or 
wealth transfers. While such assets can be particularly ef-
fective in helping to diversify risk, they also induce an ad-
ditional channel through which economic events in one 
country can impact on another country. Without these as-
sets, the only channel for a country's productivity shocks 
to affect the agents in another country is changes in rel-
ative prices, such as the world real rate of interest. With 
free trade in state-contingent assets, there is an additional 
*This is a revised version of a paper published in the International Economic Re-
view (May 1988, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 237-59): "Financial Structure and International 
Trade" by Harold Cole. The article appears here with the permission of the University 
of Pennsylvania. © All rights reserved. 
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channel for cross-country effects of productivity shocks: 
the income flows associated with these assets. 
In order to gauge the potential long-run impact of the 
recent international financial liberalization, I examine the 
behavior of some key macroeconomic aggregates like 
consumption, output, total labor effort, and the trade bal-
ance under two fairly extreme financial structures. I first 
consider a primitive system of intermediation that only in-
volves financial assets which are traded only after the res-
olution of uncertainty and are therefore not state-contin-
gent (ex post securities). This simple structure is included 
because it provides a useful benchmark and because it 
corresponds to the type of financial structure assumed in 
much of real trade theory. (See Jones and Neary 1984 for 
a survey of this literature.) I then consider the most so-
phisticated financial structure in which all conceivable fi-
nancial assets can be traded. One convenient way to repre-
sent such a complete securities market is to have an asset 
which pays off one unit for each possible future event (so-
called Arrow securities). 
The greater ability to pool risk under the more sophis-
ticated financial structure leads countries to diversify, and 
as a result, their wealth is less affected by fluctuations in 
domestic output. Yet this increased international risk-pool-
ing also makes domestic wealth more dependent on fluc-
tuations in foreign output. On net, the overall variability 
of domestic wealth falls, and this leads to a fall in the 
variability of domestic consumption. Since the link be-
tween a country's output and its wealth has been reduced, 
the covariance of domestic consumption and output de-
creases too, while that between domestic consumption and 
foreign output increases. 
Another effect of the risk-pooling is an increase in the 
variability of labor effort if, as the evidence seems to 
indicate, labor effort is procyclical. Labor effort varies 
more because the substitution effect induced by temporar-
ily higher real wages is no longer as dampened by the 
negative income effects of the increase in wealth induced 
by the productivity shock through higher real wages and 
profits. 
The impact of risk-pooling on the trade balance is am-
biguous. Since in this model the trade balance is equal to 
domestic output less domestic consumption, the increase 
in the variance of output and the decrease in the covari-
ance of output with consumption tend to increase the vari-
ance of the trade balance while the decrease in the vari-
ability of consumption tends to decrease it. 
The results implied by this model are fairly robust, in 
that they are likely to emerge in any model in which fluc-
tuations are induced by productivity shocks. However, the 
results may be sensitive to the source of randomness one 
assumes. An alternative approach by which I could have 
introduced uncertainty into the model is to allow for sto-
chastic government policies or some sort of preference 
shocks in the model.
1 
The Model in General 
1 have chosen to consider the simplest type of model that 
could generate the standard considerations of risk-sharing 
and the separation between the timing of consumption and 
income within an international context. (See Helpman and 
Razin 1978 for more elaborate models of international 
trade under uncertainty.) In order to be able to allow for 
international intertemporal trade, there are two countries 
and two periods in the model, but I restrict myself to only 
one nonstorable consumption good in each period. The 
agents in the model consume in both periods, but work 
only in the first on either of two production projects. 
Project 1 produces output in the form of the first-period 
nonstorable consumption good immediately, while project 
2 produces the consumption good only in the next period. 
These production projects use labor as the only input. In 
order to introduce a motivation for risk-sharing into the 
model, I assume that the outputs of these two projects are 
random. This randomness can be thought of as arising 
from exogenous shocks due to weather, technological in-
novation, or surprise changes in the price of unmodeled 
inputs. For simplicity, I assume that these productivity 
shocks are the same within a country on a particular type 
of project, but may differ across project types and coun-
tries. 
The projects produce the nonstorable consumption good 
according to the production function yl- = 9j/j(/j) for j — 1, 
2 and i = A, B, where _y] denotes the output of project j in 
country i, V- denotes the labor input in project j in country 
/, and 0] denotes the random productivity shock to project 
j in country /. Let Jj< •) be such that f- > 0 and/J < 0. It is 
assumed that the productivity shocks are independently 
and identically distributed elements of the finite set 0 of 
positive real numbers. The marginal distribution function 
of a country's productivity shocks, 0' = (0|,02) for i = A, 
lrThe approach I have taken here is similar to that in the real business cycle litera-
ture which assumes there is some unmodeled source of uncertainty with regard to total 
factor productivity; see, for example, Kydland and Prescott 1982, Prescott 1986, or 
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, forthcoming. 
13 B, is given by n(Ql). Less formally, the value of the 
n(Q[,Ql2) gives the probability of the realized pair of pro-
ductivity shocks being (OJ^).
2 
Because I wish to avoid distributional issues within a 
country, I assume that within any one country all the 
agents are identical. I distinguish between domestic and 
foreign agents' choice and state variables by the use of the 
superscripts A and B, respectively. The agents are as-
sumed to have identical preferences over first- and sec-
ond-period consumption as well as first-period labor ef-
fort. The domestic and foreign agents are assumed to have 
identical preferences over consumption and labor effort, 
which are given by 
(1) u(c[4) - v(/{+4) 
for i = A, B, where cj denotes period j consumption of the 
representative agent from country /. By assumption, u{-) 
is concave and homothetic, where u- > 0, u-- < 0 for j = 1, 
2, V > 0, and v" > 0. 
Empirically there are no strong results on the impact of 
changes in labor effort on the marginal utility of consump-
tion or changes in the level of consumption on the mar-
ginal disutility of effort. So it is reasonable to assume that 
there is no effect and that preferences are separable in 
consumption and labor effort, though these assumptions 
will turn out to be important in deriving some of our 
results. The assumption that u(-) is homothetic, which 
means that the marginal utilities of first- and second-pe-
riod consumption depend only on the ratio of first- to sec-
ond-period consumption, seems intuitively appealing in 
that there is no strong evidence that higher or lower over-
all consumption has much impact on people's preferences 
over future as opposed to current consumption. The com-
bined effect of these preference assumptions is to insure 
that the two consumption goods and leisure are all normal 
goods (that is, goods for which consumption increases 
with wealth), which seems consistent with what we ob-
serve. 
For simplicity, the two representative agents are by con-
struction identical ex ante and differ ex post only in terms 
of their productivity shocks. The state of the economy in 
terms of the endogenous variables in the model (in partic-
ular, the decisions of the agents) depends only on the vec-
tor of exogenous productivity shocks, 5 = (9^,9^). Since 
I assume that the shocks are independent across countries, 
the probability of any given state is just the product of the 
probabilities of the associated country shocks. For nota-
tional convenience, I let the marginal distribution function 
of the state be given by h(s) = n(QA)n(tf). 
A Simple Financial Structure 
The first system of intermediation that I will analyze is 
one involving securities that can only be traded after the 
productivity shocks have already become known. In this 
case, there is no direct insurance role for the international 
financial markets to play since the shocks are known and 
the wealth consequences of receiving a good or bad pro-
ductivity shock have already become manifest. In this re-
stricted case, the only role for an international financial 
market is to reallocate wealth between the first and second 
period. This financial structure will enable agents to spe-
cialize in production according to their comparative ad-
vantage and to separate the timing of their consumption 
and output. 
In this market, first-period consumption units are ex-
changed for promises to pay a certain number of second-
period consumption units tomorrow. The actual security 
that is exchanged in this market could be either in the 
form of a real bond which is issued by the borrower and 
which promises 1 + r units of second-period consumption 
for each unit of first-period consumption given up or in 
the form of a real IOU in which for each unit of con-
sumption received today the individual promises to pay p 
units of consumption next period. The ratio of the number 
of real consumption units that one must give up tomorrow 
to receive some number of units of consumption today 
determines simultaneously the real interest rate prevailing 
in the first period and the relative price of second-period 
consumption in terms of first. An arbitrage argument can 
be made which implies that this ratio must be the same 
regardless of how many units are exchanged by any one 
agent if the number of other agents is large. Given a rel-
ative price p of a unit of second-period consumption in 
terms of first-period consumption units, the level of first-
period saving or borrowing determines the saving level 
that must prevail in the second period if the agent's debt 
contract is not to be violated nor is wealth to be left un-
spent. That is, 
(2) QJtdO-c^picz-e^m 
2Allowing for some cross-country or intertemporal correlation in the productivity 
shocks does not change the nature of my results. However, assuming that the shocks 
are perfectly correlated across countries or have a completely permanent character does 
substantially change the model's predictions. 
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An equilibrium in this model is a set of first-and sec-
ond-period consumptions and project 1 and 2 labor inputs 
for each of the two types of agents, {c[,c2J[,r2} for i -
B, such that the actions that the equilibrium prescribes for 
any agent are individually optimal and such that the first-
and second-period goods clear the market (in the sense 
that world supply of the consumption good is equal to 
world demand). 
If the equilibrium prescription of an agent's actions is 
to be individually optimal, then it must be a solution to 
the choice problem that agent confronts in the model. The 
problem of an agent in a given country is to 
(3) choose {cvc2JiJ2} 
so as to 
(4) maximize u(cvc2) - v(/1+/2) 
subject to 
(5) cx+pc2 = Qjx(lx)+p%J2(!2). 
The agent's first-order conditions are 
(6) ux-X 
(7) u2 - Xp 
(8) v' = Xdxf'x 
(9) V = \p%J'2. 
From the first-order conditions (6) and (7), we get 
(10) u2/ux = p. 
This is the standard optimality condition from consumer 
theory which requires that the marginal rate of substitution 
between any two goods be equal to their real relative 
price. The separability of consumption and labor in the 
agent's preferences and the homotheticity of u(-) imply 
that the marginal rate of substitution between first- and 
second-period consumption depends only on their ratio. 
Similarly, first-order conditions (8) and (9) imply that 
(id e1/;(/1)/e^(/2)=p. 
What this condition says is that because of the perfect 
substitutability of labor between the two projects in the 
agent's preferences, the agent allocates labor effort so as 
to equate the present value of the marginal products of la-
bor. This reflects the fact that the agents are specializing 
in production according to their intertemporal comparative 
advantage, which is dictated by different realizations of 
their productivity shocks. 
The market-clearing conditions that must hold in equi-
librium are 
(12) + cl = eAM) + ef/,(/f) 
(13) CA2 + C
b2 = QA2f2(l$) + e*/2(/«). 
One can show by a simple algebraic exercise that these 
two conditions, along with the agent's budget constraint, 
imply that the ex post bond market also clears. 
Since the decision problem confronting both the do-
mestic and foreign representative agents is analogous to 
the problem just considered, equation (10) must be satis-
fied for both the domestic and foreign consumption levels. 
The homotheticity assumption on the utility derived from 
consumption means that the marginal rate of substitution 
in consumption depends solely on the ratio of the first-
and second-period levels. Therefore, this rate of substitu-
tion can be expressed by a function g(c2/cx). This, along 
with (10), implies that in equilibrium 
(14) g(cA2/cAl) = g(cB2/cBl)=p 
which implies that the ratio of first- and second-period 
consumption is the same in the two countries. From the 
goods market equilibrium conditions, this implies that
3 
(15) 
From equation (15), we see that the assumptions about 
agents' preferences imply that the relative price of second-
period consumption in terms of first-period consumption 
depends solely upon the ratio of second- and first-period 
world output. 
In order to understand the model's implications with 
regard to the response to different levels of the productiv-
ity parameters, it is helpful to understand the response of 
a single country when we do not take account of any in-
teraction effects that would occur through the intertempo-
ral relative price p. 
3The fact that c\lc\ = c\!c\ implies that there exists an a such that c\ = ac* for 
i = l,2. This implies that (y^+AViy^) = (c*+c?)/(c>c?) = [(l-KX)cfy[(l-KX)^] 
15 The first effect of a change in a country's own pro-
ductivity parameter (0) is to cause the level of output and 
the marginal product of labor of the affected project to 
change. This, in turn, leads to a relative reallocation of 
labor effort toward the project for which the productivity 
shock variable has become relatively higher, and the 
change in the relative labor allocation along with the 
increase in the project's relative productivity shock vari-
able combine to raise the output of this good and lower 
the output of the other good.
4 At the same time, the in-
come effect tends to cause labor effort in both projects to 
fall. It is ambiguous whether total labor effort rises in 
response to an increase in one or both of the productivity 
shock variables. However, because the relative price is 
unchanged, consumption increases in both periods in such 
a way as to keep their ratio constant.
5 
The impact of any foreign productivity shock on the 
domestic agents' choices can only come through the inter-
temporal price of consumption. An increase in the real 
world interest rate, (1 /p) - 1, would have the following 
substitution effects. Equation (10) implies that cjc2 would 
fall, while equation (11) implies that l{/l2 would rise. Thus, 
the substitution effects tend to cause the trade balance, 
which is given by the difference between output and con-
sumption, to increase in the first period and to decrease in 
the second. This follows naturally from the fact that, un-
der this primitive financial system, the trade balance is 
equal to saving. What would actually happen to the levels 
of the agents' choice variables would also depend upon 
the income effects, which would in turn depend upon 
whether the agents were net borrowers or lenders in the 
first period prior to the change in the real interest rate. 
I am now ready to undertake a full or general equilib-
rium analysis of the two-country economy's response to 
productivity shocks. From equation (11), I get 
(16) eta(ifyQ&vt) = ef/^/fyef/^/f). 
Equation (16) implies that the international bond market 
has served to equalize the ratio of marginal products of 
labor between countries. From this condition, we can also 
see the impact of productivity shocks upon domestic and 
foreign output. An increase in 0^ implies that l\ will rise 
relative to l2 and also that lAJl2 will rise relative to l\ll\. 
But since this will change the world's output ratio, the 
real rate of interest will also fall, which will reduce the 
magnitudes of the above shifts. In addition, the rise in p 
will cause a reallocation of labor effort in the foreign 
country, resulting in a fall in l
BJl
B2.
 This reallocation of la-
bor effort will be induced via changes in the world interest 
rate. Similarly, the rise in p will induce a shift in con-
sumption toward the first period. 
In equilibrium, the relationship between productivity 
shocks and the trade balance, which is simply the differ-
ence between a country's output and consumption in a 
particular period, is ambiguous. A change in a country's 
productivity shock parameters will induce a change in the 
world's relative price of the second-period consumption 
good. This change in the relative price will induce both 
substitution and income effects. The substitution effects 
induced by the change in the relative price will tend to re-
duce the magnitude of the change in the trade balance; 
however, since the ratio of current to future consumption 
and the ratio of the current to the future marginal produc-
tivity of labor are equalized across countries, these price-
induced substitution effects, induced by the change in the 
relative price of the consumption good, cannot overcome 
the direct substitution effects. The change in the relative 
price of the consumption good can also induce income ef-
fects if one of the countries is a net lender and the other 
a net borrower. The substitution and income effects in-
duced by the price change can overcome the direct substi-
tution effects. 
The capital market is serving as the only propagation 
mechanism through which shocks in one country impact 
upon another. This is due in part to the fact that I have ab-
stracted away from labor, capital, and intermediate goods 
flows between countries. 
A Sophisticated Financial Structure 
A securities market serves two general functions: It allows 
agents to separate the timing of their consumption and 
production activities, and it allows risk-sharing. The primi-
tive system of ex post bonds just considered can only ful-
fill the first of these two functions. It cannot allow for 
risk-sharing since trading in these bonds occurs only after 
the resolution of uncertainty, and the payoffs are not state-
contingent. I will now consider a model in which the most 
elaborate possible system of financial contracts can be ex-
changed prior to the realization of the productivity shocks. 
This will enable the financial structure I consider here to 
4Removing the assumption that project 1 and 2 labor efforts are perfect substitutes 
dampens the change in the labor effort ratio, but not the implied direction. 
5 These statements are verified and an explicit expression for determining whether 
labor effort rises or falls is derived in Cole 1988. 
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completely fulfill both of the two general functions of a 
securities market. 
Formally, I will now assume that there exists a com-
plete contingent-claims securities market which meets be-
fore the productivity shocks are known. By this I mean 
that for every possible state 5" (for every possible realiza-
tion of both the first- and second-period productivity 
shocks both at home and abroad) there exists an individ-
ual security with which one can promise to buy and sell 
units of both the first- and second-period consumption 
goods conditional on the state s being realized. Formally, 
s is defined as a vector which gives the values of the four 
productivity shocks, and I will denote the set of possible 
states by S. As Arrow (1964) originally observed, this 
type of elaborate securities market means that agents will 
be able to treat consumption and output in each state and 
in each period as a different good with a known price. 
The price of a unit of the first-period consumption good 
in state s is q(s), and that of the second-period good is 
r(s). I will normalize these prices by requiring that 
(17) £{<?(*)+ r(s)} = l. 
In the previous model, the agents made all of their de-
cisions after all uncertainty was resolved; hence, they only 
needed to be able to evaluate certain outcomes. Here, 
however, I will have to define the agents' preferences over 
uncertain prospects. I will make the standard assumption 
that agents seek to maximize the expected value of their 
utility function. 
With this financial structure and my assumptions about 
preferences, the maximization problem of an agent can be 
written in this way: 
(18) choose {cx(s),c2(s),ll (s),l2(s)} 
for all s in S so as to 
(19) maximize {u[cx(s\c2(s)] - vt/^s) + l2(s)] }/z(s) 
subject to 
(20) E/^MWiIWl-^)} 
+ r(s){Q2(s)f2[l2(s)] - c2(s)})h(s) = 0. 
An agent's first-order conditions are 
(21) ux(.) = Xq(s) 
(22) m2(.) = Xr(s) 
(23) v'(-) = Xq(s)Ql(s)f'l(-) 
(24) v'(.) = M#)/;(-). 




 are independently and 
identically distributed, along with the assumption of iden-
tical preferences and production functions, implies that the 
domestic and foreign agents are ex ante identical. This, in 
turn, implies that XA = X8, or that the agents' expected 
marginal utilities of income are equal. Because of the sep-
arability of consumption and labor effort in the agents' 
preferences, this implies that 





for all s in S, since the marginal utility of consumption de-
pends solely on the level of consumption. Or, in words, 
the implication is that for any given state of the world, the 
consumptions of the foreign and domestic agents are iden-
tical. This is in contrast to the model with only ex post 
securities, where only the ratios of first- and second-period 
consumption were equalized, not their levels. With Arrow 
securities, the agents choose to completely insure their 
consumption against individual-specific risk; however, 
their consumption is still subject to aggregate risk. 
Once again, an agent's first-order conditions for labor 
effort, (23) and (24), imply that the ratio of marginal prod-
ucts is equalized across countries, but labor effort itself is 
not equalized. This is because there does not exist a mar-
ket in productivity shocks; that is, one's 9 is a nontraded 
input, and laborers are immobile across countries. Unlike 
the case of consumption, agents are not completely insur-
ing their labor effort against individual-specific risks. This 
stems from the fact that while the price of consumption is 
the same in both countries in any given state of the world, 
the price of leisure is not. The agent with the higher pro-
ductivity parameter works harder, but consumes no more 
than the agent with the lower productivity parameter. In 
fact, the impact of an increase in one agent's productivity 
parameter on the current project's effort level of the other 
agent is negative. For example, if the project 1 productiv-
ity parameter of agent A increases, then the project 1 
effort level of the other agent, agent B, actually declines, 
as does B
9s total effort level, though £'s effort level 
devoted to producing future output increases. For this 
17 reason, labor effort across countries will actually tend to 
be negatively correlated in the model. 
While this negative correlation also arises under the 
first financial structure that I considered, it is more neg-
ative here. This is because with complete markets, the 
transfer from agent A to agent B of first-period consump-
tion lowers £'s marginal utility of consumption in that pe-
riod, which lowers /f while inducing a rise in l\. The 
equalization of the per-period marginal utilities of con-
sumption implies that agent A shares equally in terms of 
consumption in the net increase in second-period output 
induced by the reallocation of effort. 
While an agent would prefer a higher level of the pro-
ductivity shocks for the world as a whole, ex post the 
agent would prefer that the other agent's productivity 
parameters be higher than his or her own. Under the pre-
vious financial structure, which is composed of ex post se-
curities, an agent prefers to have his or her own productiv-
ity parameters be higher than the other agent's. Thus, the 
change in the financial structure has resulted in the sort of 
ex post preference reversal first noted by Stockman and 
Delias (1986) within the context of a model of anticipated 
tariffs. 
Previously, the only channel for shocks in one country 
to impact upon another was the bond market and the in-
tertemporal relative price of consumption. The existence 
of an Arrow securities market introduces a direct depen-
dence between one agent's choice variables and the other 
agent's productivity shocks which does not depend upon 
the intertemporal relative price of consumption. This direct 
dependence can potentially arise within any financial 
structure which allows agents to trade contingent assets 
prior to the resolution of uncertainty. Asset returns are act-
ing as an important transmission mechanism because the 
agents contract in the ex ante securities market to receive 
state-contingent transfers. The magnitude of the net trans-
fer that one agent receives from the other agent is posi-
tively related to the discrepancy between the productivity 
parameters of the first agent and those of the second. 
The change in the financial structure has altered the rel-
ative magnitudes of the fluctuations in consumption and 
output. Variations in an agent's productivity parameters 
induce both income and substitution effects. The existence 
of Arrow securities reduces the magnitude of the income 
effect associated with changes in an agent's own produc-
tivity parameters. In states in which an agent's productiv-
ity parameter for a period is relatively high (or low), the 
agent has committed to deliver a larger (or smaller) num-
ber of that period's consumption units to the other agent. 
The agents have used the Arrow securities to enter into an 
implicit pooling agreement, and as a result, consumption 
in each of the two countries is less variable. The strong 
result that the agents in the two countries equalize their 
consumption in each state is dependent upon the assump-
tion that the agents' preferences are separable in con-
sumption and labor effort and that their ex ante wealth is 
equal. However, in any model in which agents desire to 
smooth their consumption, one will find the variance of 
consumption decreasing and the covariance between do-
mestic and foreign consumption increasing as financial 
markets become more complete. 
The covariance between an agent's consumption and 
the agent's productivity shock variables has also been 
reduced. An agent's ex post wealth is now less positively 
related to the agent's own productivity parameters. This 
reduces the magnitude of the income effects which tended 
to cause the agent to decrease labor effort when productiv-
ity parameters were high and increase that effort when 
they were low, which in turn increases the variability of 
the agent's output. In addition, there has been a reduction 
in the tendency for output and consumption to move to-
gether. This reduction occurs because one agent's obli-
gations to the other agent are positively related to the first 
agent's productivity shock variables. 
The impact of the change in the financial structure up-
on the variability of an agent's labor effort and the trade 
balance is ambiguous. The direction of the change in the 
variability of labor effort will depend upon whether the 
substitution effect dominated movements in labor effort 
under the previous financial structure. If the substitution 
effect dominated the income effect, as seems to be im-
plied by the empirical observation that labor effort is pro-
cyclical, then the change will cause labor effort to become 
more variable. To the extent that the income effect dom-
inated the substitution effect, the change in financial struc-
ture will tend to reduce the variability of labor effort. The 
variance of the trade balance TB can be written as 
(27) var(TO) = var(^-c) = var(^) + var(c) - 2cov(j,c). 
As was pointed out above, the change in the financial 
structure has raised the variance of y and lowered the co-
variance between y and c, which tends to raise the vari-
ance of the trade balance. However, the fall in the vari-
ance of consumption tends to lower it. 
It is worth noting in passing that the trade balance is no 
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longer equal to an agent's first-period saving since it does 
not take into account the ex post transfers induced by the 
Arrow securities. With the first financial structure I con-
sidered, since the trade balance was equal to saving, the 
present value of the trade balance (the sum of the first-
period balance and the second-period balance weighted by 
its relative price) was always equal to zero. That need no 
longer be true here. In fact, it is quite possible here for a 
country to have a trade deficit (or surplus) in both periods 
if its productivity shocks are low (or high) relative to 
those abroad. Thus, the more sophisticated financial struc-
ture would seem to allow for more persistent deficits in 
the trade balance. 
Also, with the first financial structure considered, and 
under the assumption that there were no initial debts, the 
trade balance was equal to the current account, which is 
a measure of the net accumulation of claims (in the form 
of credit extended or direct investment abroad) on the rest 
on the world. There is a natural sense in which the current 
account is equal to zero with complete markets. This is 
because in the ex ante securities market, claims of equal 
value are traded, and after that there is no further asset 
trade and, hence, no net accumulation or decumulation. 
Related Research 
In light of the discussion thus far, two natural concerns 
arise. One is the extent to which the results derived are 
robust: if I compare two financial structures which can 
somehow be ranked in terms of their sophistication, will 
similar qualitative conclusions emerge? The other concern 
is the extent to which the predicted changes are quantita-
tively significant and, hence, should be taken seriously. 
In order to address the first concern, I need some sort 
of measure in terms of completeness of financial struc-
tures if I am to rank them. This is a difficult issue. How-
ever, I can restrict myself to more obvious comparisons. 
If a given financial structure allows all of the trades that 
another structure does and some that it does not, then I 
can safely say that the given structure is more complete. 
In Cole 1988, an intermediate comparison is made in 
which production is undertaken by firms. The firms hire 
labor in competitive labor markets. Equity claims on the 
firm's profits alone are traded in the ex ante securities 
market. The results are consistent with those I have de-
rived here. However, this is again a fairly stark compari-
son, and there is nothing to suggest that small changes in 
a given financial structure could not lead to perverse re-
sults. (See Hart 1975 in this regard.) Clearly, then, the re-
sults that I have derived must be viewed with some de-
gree of caution. 
With regard to the second concern, there are really two 
questions: To what extent does this matter in welfare 
terms? And to what extent are changes in financial struc-
ture likely to lead to different outcomes? The reason for 
the distinction is that different financial structures could 
result in very different outcomes, for example, in terms of 
agents' consumption or labor effort choices, without there 
being much difference in their equilibrium welfare levels. 
The first of these questions has been addressed in a 
series of papers beginning with that of Cole and Obstfeld 
(1991), who argue that at least for developed countries in 
which output fluctuations tend to be small and outputs 
fairly highly correlated, the welfare gains or losses associ-
ated with greater international risk-sharing are likely to be 
small. Obstfeld (1991) and Van Wincoop (1991) have 
explored the effects of alternative specifications of pref-
erences—and Obstfeld, the stochastic process generating 
output—on the cost of consumption variability. While 
alternative preferences which raise the costs associated 
with consumption variability, like allowing for habit per-
sistence, can make the welfare consequences of consump-
tion fluctuations larger, it seems unlikely that these spec-
ifications are generally consistent with the data. For ex-
ample, preferences which place a high premium on con-
sumption-smoothing would almost certainly generate a too 
smooth consumption series and too variable investment 
series within a standard real business cycle model since 
standard preference specifications are consistent with the 
data in this regard. Obstfeld's results on the cost of con-
sumption variability across countries suggest that this cost 
remains fairly small for developed countries, where output 
fluctuations tend to be small, but may be larger for under-
developed countries. 
In order to deal with the second question, about differ-
ent financial structures leading to different outcomes, one 
would need to consider a plausibly parameterized quanti-
tative general equilibrium model. This was precisely the 
goal of Baxter and Crucini (1992), who have undertaken 
a comparison similar to mine. They do their analysis with-
in a standard real business cycle model which has been 
expanded to consider two countries. Qualitatively, they 
find that in their model the effects of shifting between two 
financial structures which are analogous to the ones I have 
considered are essentially the same as the results implied 
by the model presented here for the limited number of sta-
tistics that they report. Specifically, the cross-country cor-
19 relation of consumption increases, while those of output 
and labor effort decline. 
Unfortunately, Baxter and Crucini's (1992) quantitative 
answers with regard to magnitudes of the effects of chang-
ing financial structures turn out to depend crucially on the 
fine details of the stochastic process governing the fluctua-
tions in the productivity parameters, about which there is 
a great deal of uncertainty. If the productivity process is 
trend stationary, so shocks are persistent but not perma-
nent, then they find, as did earlier related work by Backus, 
Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), that the structure of financial 
markets doesn't matter much. However, if the productivity 
process is difference stationary, so that all shocks are per-
manent, then the structure of financial markets appears to 
matter a great deal. Under the assumption that the produc-
tivity process is difference stationary, Baxter and Crucini 
(1992) generally confirm the results of our analytic model. 
One of the surprises in their results is that increasing 
the sophistication of international financial markets actu-
ally switches the sign of the cross-country correlation of 
consumption from negative to positive, while the cross-
country correlation of output goes from positive to nega-
tive. In addition, and as was noted in the discussion of 
Arrow securities, a complete market structure tends to 
induce a negative cross-country correlation of labor effort. 
Baxter and Crucini (1992) not only confirm that the cor-
relation becomes more negative as financial markets be-
come more complete, but they also find that the correla-
tion is negative in all of the cases that they consider. This 
finding is substantially at variance with the generally posi-
tive cross-country correlations of labor effort that we see 
in the data. 
the stochastic process generating productivity shocks. 
There are also other issues which I have not yet men-
tioned. For example, an unexamined question is, How 
sensitive are my results to the assumed domestic financial 
structure? Are there greater gains from international risk-
sharing when domestic financial markets are more primi-
tive? Another example of a potentially important question 
for future research is, What is the role of international 
financial markets in risk-sharing and in ensuring an ef-
ficient allocation of capital across countries?
6 In both 
cases it may turn out to be the case that these markets 
have more to contribute when countries are very dissimi-
lar, such as developed and undeveloped or fast and slow 
growing, than when they are very similar. 
Concluding Comments 
The research program that aims to examine the impact of 
changes in international financial structure on agents' de-
cisions and, hence, on macroeconomic aggregates is still 
at a quite preliminary stage, and there is ample scope for 
future research. The simple model presented here is attrac-
tive in that it seems capable of generating some fairly 
strong empirical predictions. However, many of the funda-
mental issues still remain to be resolved. 
Foremost is the question, Are changes in financial struc-
ture of the magnitude seen in the real world, as opposed 
to the stark contrasts considered in this article, likely to 
have much effect in terms of either welfare or actions? 
The answer to this question may turn on a number of fac-
tors. As was noted, one of these may well be the nature of 
Obstfeld (1992) generates a model in which the growth rate itself may be affected 
by the degree of financial intermediation. 
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